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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 We are asked to determine whether Pennsylvania’s 
criminal statute proscribing possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-
113(a)(30), is a “divisible” statute under Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). If it is divisible, then 
convictions under that statute are subject to the modified 
categorical approach when determining if they are predicate 
offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e) (“the ACCA”). We hold that 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 
780-113(a)(30) is divisible and, accordingly, the trial court’s 
use of the modified categorical approach was proper.
1
 We 
will affirm. 
                                              
 1 We previously concluded the modified categorical 
approach was proper when assessing whether a conviction 
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I. 
 The underlying facts are not in dispute. After a jury 
trial, Kevin Abbott was convicted of possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), 
among other charges. His sentence included a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum for violating the ACCA. That act states: 
 
In the case of a person who 
violates section 922(g) of this title 
and has three previous convictions 
by any court referred to in section 
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent 
felony or a serious drug offense, 
or both, committed on occasions 
different from one another, such 
person shall be fined under this 
title and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years[.] 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The sentencing court found that three 
of Abbott’s previous convictions were “serious drug 
offenses” under the ACCA and invoked the fifteen-year 
minimum. Abbott’s attorney did not object to the use of these 
prior convictions as ACCA predicates. 
                                                                                                     
under 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30) is a predicate 
offense under the ACCA. United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 
205 (3d Cir. 2012). We revisit the issue solely because Tucker 
was decided before Descamps and did not address whether 35 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30) is divisible. 
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 Abbott challenged an unrelated portion of his sentence 
on direct appeal. We affirmed. United States v. Abbott, 574 
F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). Abbott then petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari regarding that 
issue. The Supreme Court granted the petition and affirmed 
the sentence. Abbott v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18 (2010). 
 
 Abbott filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and we appointed counsel. The lone issue presented in his 
counseled § 2255 petition is whether Abbott’s attorney at 
sentencing was ineffective for failing to contest the use of his 
prior conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, 
under 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30), as an ACCA 
predicate offense. The District Court denied the petition 
without a hearing, noting that the sentencing court properly 
employed the modified categorical approach. It concluded 
Abbott suffered no prejudice from his attorney’s alleged 
shortcomings. Noting the then-pending Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the District Court issued a 
certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 on the sole 
of issue of whether Descamps altered the ACCA analysis. 
That issue is now before us.
2
 
 
II. 
 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), it is unlawful for a person 
who has been previously convicted of a felony to possess a 
firearm. A defendant convicted under that section is subject to 
a fifteen-year minimum sentence under the ACCA if he “has 
                                              
 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 2255. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1291 and 2253. 
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three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious 
drug offense, or both[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  
 
 Accordingly, in a case in which the defendant has been 
convicted of § 922(g) and the prosecution seeks the § 924(e) 
enhancement, a sentencing court must decide whether that 
defendant has three previous convictions for a “violent felony 
or a serious drug offense.” When deciding whether a previous 
conviction counts as a “violent felony or a serious drug 
offense” under the ACCA, a sentencing court may look only 
to the elements of a defendant’s prior conviction, not “to the 
particular facts underlying those convictions.” Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2283 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
600 (1990)). This elements-based inquiry has come to be 
called the “categorical approach.” See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2281. 
 
 For example, in Taylor, the Supreme Court confronted 
a case in which the defendant had been convicted of a § 
922(g) violation and the sentencing court was asked to invoke 
the fifteen-year minimum under the ACCA. 495 U.S. at 579. 
The sentencing court had to decide whether the defendant’s 
previous burglary conviction counted as a “violent felony.” 
Id. at 578. The Supreme Court declared the proper inquiry for 
a sentencing court is not whether the defendant’s actual 
conduct constituted a crime of violence (e.g., whether he, in 
fact, brought a gun, confronted any individuals inside the 
house, or conducted his crime in any particularly “violent” 
way) but whether the elements of the crime of conviction 
necessarily matched the elements of a “violent felony.” It 
concluded the ACCA “generally requires the trial court to 
look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition 
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of the prior offense.” Id. at 602. A court should “not [look] to 
the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. 
 
 The Taylor decision did, however, admit of a “narrow 
range of cases” when a sentencing court may look beyond the 
elements of a prior conviction to decide if it can serve as an 
ACCA predicate offense. Id. at 602. This alternative method 
has become known as the “modified categorical approach.” 
Under Descamps, the modified categorical approach may be 
used when a statute underlying a prior conviction “lists 
multiple, alternative elements,” 133 S. Ct. at 2285, rather than 
a “single, indivisible set of elements,” id. at 2282. The 
Supreme Court referred to such statutes as “divisible 
statutes.” Id. at 2281. The purpose of the modified categorical 
approach is to “help effectuate the categorical analysis when a 
divisible statute . . . renders opaque which element played a 
part in the defendant’s conviction.” Id. at 2283. Once a 
sentencing court determines the modified categorical 
approach applies, the court may look beyond the face of the 
statute to the “charging document, written plea agreement, 
transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by 
the trial judge to which the defendant assented” to determine 
which of the alternative elements was involved in the 
defendant’s conviction. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 16 (2005). 
 
 For example, the Court in Taylor considered, 
hypothetically, whether a defendant’s prior conviction under 
a state burglary statute that outlawed entry into both a 
building and an automobile constituted a “crime of violence” 
under § 924(e). Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Under the Court’s 
previous reasoning, only a burglary of a building could count 
as a predicate offense. Id. at 599. A sentencing court applying 
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the categorical approach—looking only at the face of the 
statute of conviction—would be unable to tell if a burglary 
conviction counted as a “crime of violence” because it could 
have been for burglary of either an automobile or a building. 
But if the jury was “actually required to find” which of the 
alternatives (either a building or an automobile) had been 
proved then the sentencing court could look beyond the face 
of the statute to determine which alternative had been found 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602. In that example, if the 
jury “necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict, 
then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction 
for enhancement.” Id.  
 
III. 
 Abbott contends the District Court erred because it 
applied the modified categorical approach to an indivisible 
statute. Specifically, Abbott contends the District Court 
improperly looked beyond the statutory elements of 35 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30) to determine that his conviction 
was an ACCA predicate. We do not agree. The statute in 
question is divisible and, as such, convictions are properly 
assessed under the modified categorical approach.  
 
 Section 780-113(a)(30) outlaws “the manufacture, 
delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, 
a controlled substance[.]” 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-
113(a)(30). The punishment for violating § 780-113(a)(30) 
depends on the type of controlled substance.
3
 If the violation 
                                              
 3 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-104 lists the schedules of 
Pennsylvania’s controlled substances. 
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results from possession of Barbital, for example, the 
maximum punishment is three years. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 
780-113(f)(3). If the violation results from possession of less 
than 1,000 pounds of marijuana, a maximum imprisonment of 
five years applies. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(2). And if 
the possession involves any “derivative or preparation of coca 
leaves,” a maximum imprisonment of ten years applies. 35 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(1.1). The type of controlled 
substance involved in the violation similarly affects the 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 7508(a). 
 
 Abbott contends the statute is indivisible because it 
simply outlaws possession with the intent to distribute “a 
controlled substance.” Unlike the theoretical statute in Taylor 
that outlawed burglary of an “automobile as well as a 
building,” the statute here, he contends, does not list 
alternative elements. In order to secure a conviction, he 
continues, the jury must find that the defendant possessed 
with the intent to distribute an unspecified “controlled 
substance”—whether the controlled substance is marijuana or 
cocaine is of no moment.  
 
 Abbott’s contention lacks merit. The Supreme Court 
has clarified that  “‘any facts that increase the prescribed 
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ 
are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 
2160 (2013) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 (2000)). As noted, the type of controlled substance 
involved in a violation of 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-
113(a)(30) alters the prescribed range of penalties. 
Accordingly, the type of drug, insofar as it increases the 
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possible range of penalties, is an element of the crime.
4
 
Because 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30) can be violated 
by the possession of and intent to distribute many different 
drugs, the types of which can increase the prescribed range of 
penalties, the statute includes several alternative elements and 
is therefore divisible. The District Court’s reliance on the 
modified categorical approach was proper.
5
 
                                              
 4 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reached a 
similar conclusion. In Commonwealth v. Swavely, 554 A.2d 
946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the defendant was arrested and 
charged with multiple counts of possession with the intent to 
distribute a controlled substance under 35 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 780-113(a)(30), among other charges. Two of the charges 
stemmed from the delivery of two different prohibited 
narcotics in a single plastic vial. The defendant argued only 
one offense occurred when he sold the vial because he had 
only once delivered controlled substances. Accordingly, he 
contended, two punishments for the single sale would violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The majority disagreed, 
declaring that the type of drug was an element of the offense. 
554 A.2d at 949. It concluded, “when the vial containing the 
two separate drugs was delivered, two separate offenses 
occurred[.]” Id. See also Commonwealth v. Munday, 78 A.3d 
661, 665-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (recognizing Alleyne 
requires any fact that increases a defendant’s mandatory 
minimum be treated as an element of a new offense). 
 
5
 Abbott also asserts that Commonwealth v. Kelly, 409 
A.2d 21 (Pa. 1979), stands for the proposition that the fact 
finder does not need to find which drug type was involved in 
the § 780-113(a)(30) violation. We addressed that contention 
in Tucker and rejected it. 703 F.3d at 215-16.  
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IV. 
 The District Court properly employed the modified 
categorical approach to conclude Abbott’s previous 
conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is 
an ACCA predicate offense. After the court determined that 
the modified categorical approach was proper, it looked to the 
charging document to determine which alternative element 
had been proved. This was proper under Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). The charging document—the 
Bill of Information—specified that the drug at issue was 
crack cocaine. 
 
 A previous conviction is an ACCA predicate if it is “a 
violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(1). Under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” is 
defined as: 
 
an offense under State law, 
involving manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing with 
intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 802)), for which a 
maximum term of imprisonment 
of ten years or more is prescribed 
by law[.] 
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18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
6
 Under Pennsylvania law, 
possession with the intent to distribute cocaine is punishable 
by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. 35 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 780-113(f)(1.1). Accordingly, Abbott’s 
previous conviction under 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-
113(a)(30) for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is a 
“serious drug offense” and properly served as a predicate 
offense for the imposition of the fifteen-year minimum 
sentence under the ACCA. 
 
V. 
 Pennsylvania’s possession with intent to distribute 
statute, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(30), is divisible. 
Accordingly, a conviction for its violation is subject to the 
modified categorical approach when determining whether the 
conviction is a predicate offense under the ACCA. The 
District Court properly conducted the modified categorical 
approach and correctly concluded Abbott suffered no 
prejudice from his attorney’s alleged shortcomings at 
sentencing. 
 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction and 
sentence. 
                                              
 6 Cocaine is a controlled substance under the 
Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812. 
